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Household Energy Demand and the Equity and Efficiency
Aspects of Subsidy Reform in Indonesia
Susan Olivia* and John Gibson**
The proper design of price interventions in energy markets requires
consideration of equity and efficiency effects. In this paper, budget survey data
from 29,000 Indonesian households are used to estimate a demand system for
five energy sources, which is identified by the spatial variation in unit values
(expenditures divided by quantities). We correct for the various quality and
measurement error biases that result when unit values are used as proxies for
market prices. The price elasticities are combined with tax and subsidy rates to
calculate the marginal social cost of price changes for each item. The results
suggest that even with high levels of inequality aversion there is a case for
reducing the large subsidies on kerosene in Indonesia, supporting the reforms
that have been announced recently.
1. INTRODUCTION
Energy demand is rising rapidly in developing countries. The energy pric-
ing policies of those countries are therefore increasingly important to the efficient
use of the world's energy supply. Some developing country energy markets are
highly distorted by consumer subsidies (IEA, 1999). For example, the Government
of Indonesia spent over US$13 billion dollars on consumer fuel subsidies in 2005.
These subsidies have a major effect on the overall energy balance in Indonesia be-
cause households account for about 45 percent of total energy consumption. There
also are large fiscal effects, with about one-quarter of the government budget (and
about five percent of GDP) going on fuel subsidies (Sen and Steer, 2005).
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Dramatic reforms have been attempted by the Indonesian government in
response to this escalating cost of fuel subsidies. In October 2005 the subsidised
price of kerosene was raised 186 percent, from Rp 700 per litre (US 7 cents) to
Rp 2000 per litre (US 19 cents). The prices for diesel and gasoline were raised
by approximately 90 percent, following on from increases of 30 percent in March
2005 (Table 1). These earlier price increases did not apply to kerosene. Moreover,
fuel subsidies were timetabled for a complete phase out by either the end of 2006
(gasoline and diesel) or the end of 2007 (kerosene). These energy subsidies are
meant to be replaced with a set of targeted subsidies, whose benefits are to be
designed so that they are restricted to low-income groups (Kompas, 2005; Jakarta
Post, 2005).
It is unclear whether these ambitious plans for reform will be realised.
First, despite the substantial price rises enacted in 2005, there is still a long way
to go if Indonesian fuel prices are to be set at world levels. The kerosene price in
October 2005 was only 31 percent of the world price, while gasoline and diesel
prices were about two-thirds of the world level (Table 1). Second, many previous
attempts at reforming energy price policy in Indonesia have failed because of
the resulting political difficulties. Attempted reforms in 2003 were reversed after
widespread protests while the price rises in 1998 are believed to have precipitated
the downfall of the Suharto regime (BBC, 2005; Economist, 2005). Moreover,
these subsidies have been long-term features of the Indonesian economy, dating
back to the mid-1970s (Dick, 1980). The subsidization of especially kerosene has
been seen as one feasible way of meeting equity objectives, because the poor are
presumed to use kerosene as their main cooking fuel.' However there are debates
about whether the poor are the main beneficiaries of kerosene subsidies (Sumarto
and Saryahadi, 2001). Indeed, even though there was early evidence that a dispro-
portionate share of the subsidy was being captured by richer urban households,
the subsidy policy continued to be strengthened and kerosene prices were held
below one-fifth of the world level as far back as 1980 (Pitt, 1985).
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence to help assess
whether the proposed reforms of energy price policy in Indonesia are likely to be
welfare-enhancing. Specifically, the equity and efficiency effects of price changes
in the household energy sector are analysed. To achieve this aim, the marginal
social costs of indirect taxes and subsidies are calculated for five fuels and house-
hold energy sources: kerosene, gasoline, oil, LPG, and electricity. These marginal
social costs depend on the rate at which household welfare falls as prices increase,
and on the rate at which net public revenue rises (Ahmad and Stem, 1984). If a re-
form is optimally designed, the costs in terms of social welfare of the last Rupiah
of government expenditure saved by cutting subsidies (or raising taxes) on each
good should be equal. To obtain the two required parameters - the welfare deriva-
tive and the revenue derivative - information is needed on tax and subsidy rates,
consumption patterns, and aggregate demand responses. These requirements are
1. This reliance on energy subsidies reflects the limited capacity for income transfers, which is a
feature of many developing countries.
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Table 1. Recent Changes in Regulated Fuel Products Prices, Rupiah per
Litre and Percentage Change (Percent of World Price)
Jan 2003-Feb 2005
% change ^
from
Price
Gasoline 1,810
(36%)
Kerosene (household) 700
(11%)
Automotive Diesel 1,650
(33%)
Mar-Sep 2005
% change
from
Price
2,400
(56%)
700
(11%)
2,100
(45%)
% change
from
FehO5
33%
(68%)
0%
(31%)
27%
(68%)
October 2005 onwards
Price
4,500
2,000
4,300
Mar 05
88%
186%
105%
FebO5
149%
186%
161%
Source: World Bank (2005)
less onerous than for optimal taxation exercises because for small ('marginal')
change in prices, the effect on each household's welfare can be measured by their
current consumption of the good.^ Thus, the analysis follows the recommendation
of Newbery (2005) to use the basic principles of public finance to introduce order
into discussions of how energy taxes and subsidies might rationally be set.
This empirical analysis is needed because the previous literature on
energy demand in Indonesia does not provide clear guidance for evaluating the
subsidy reforms. On the one hand, Pitt (1985) concluded that the price of kerosene
should be increased on both equity and efficiency grounds. In part, this conclusion
rested on an estimate from household survey data that the elasticity of kerosene
demand with respect to its own price was -1.03, suggesting that price distortions
would create large substitution effects. But other estimated elasticities are not
nearly so large: Koshal et al. (1999) use time series data to estimate a long-run
own-price elasticity of demand of only -0.17. If the demand for kerosene really
is this price inelastic the efficiency losses from the subsidy might be evaluated
as being less important than the presumed benefits in the form of transfers to the
poor.-' Consequently, once distributional concems were taken into account by Yi-
zhaki and Lewis (1996) they reached the opposite conclusion to Pitt (1985); spe-
cifically, Yitzhaki and Lewis concluded that there would be aggregate improve-
ments in welfare from increasing the subsidy on kerosene.
The wide range in estimated own-price elasticities of demand for kero-
sene may result from the use of different data. Pitt (1985) used household sur-
2. In contrast, the calculation of optimal tax rates imposes severe informational requirements,
including explicit utility functions for agents, as well as the distribution of income; demand responses
have to be evaluated at the optimum, a point which may be quite far away from the current position of
the economy; and the estimates have to be made on how behavioral responses themselves change in
response to taxes (Madden, 1996).
3. Noting again that there is contention about how much of the subsidy is captured by the poor.
This issue is discussed in the penultimate section of the paper.
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veys, with prices proxied by unit values (expenditures divided by quantities), and
the identification of demand responses coming from spatial rather than temporal
variation in prices. Advantages of these data are the larger sample sizes compared
with short time-series (for example, McRae (1994) uses just 15 annual observa-
tions to estimate gasoline demand models for Indonesia and several other Asian
countries) and that they can provide disaggregated elasticities for target groups
such as rural households or the poorest quintile of households. However, unit
values are not the same thing as prices, and it has been shown by Deaton (1990)
that simply treating unit values as direct substitutes for prices (as Pitt did) may
cause estimated elasticities to be too large in absolute terms, causing substitution
possibilities to be overstated and tending to raise the calculated efficiency cost of
subsidies. Therefore, in this paper we use the estimation methods developed by
Deaton (1990) to correct the biases that result from using unit values.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the
theoretical framework underlying the calculation of the social costs of marginal
tax and subsidy reform. In Section 3, we describe the data and econometric esti-
mation methods. Section 4 presents the estimation results for the disaggregated
household energy demand system. Section 5 looks at the implications of the elas-
ticity estimates for the reform of household energy and fuel prices in Indonesia.
This section also discusses evidence about whether the poor benefit the most from
kerosene subsidies. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2. THE MARGINAL TAX REFORM APPROACH
In an infiuential paper, Ahmad and Stern (1984) proposed a methodol-
ogy for evaluating marginal tax and subsidy reforms. The crucial parameter of the
Ahmad and Stem model is what they call the marginal social cost (MSC) of a unit
of public revenue. This is made up of two components: a welfare derivative and
a revenue derivative. Specifically, a decrease in the subsidy rate, x. on good (, (or
equivalently, a tax increase) will cause welfare to change at rate dV / 3T. and net
government revenue to change at rate dR I 3x.. The ratio of these two derivatives
gives the marginal social cost, X. of raising one unit of net revenue (saving one unit
of expenditures) by decreasing the subsidy rate on good ;:
"•• - -
Goods with low X. ratios are those that are candidates for either a tax in-
crease or a subsidy reduction. When all the ratios are the same there is no further
scope for beneficial reform.
This approach can be implemented by noting that the welfare derivative
(the numerator of (1)) is a pure distributional measure for good / and it is simply
the ratio of two average budget shares: w^lw. (Deaton, 1997). The first average
budget share, w^  is weighted to reflect equity considerations:
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w'== [E (x / n )-^ x w. ] / E X (2)
where w. is the budget share for good / in household m, x and n are the total ex-
penditure and size of household m, and e is the coefficient of inequality aversion."* A
range of values of e between zero (no inequality aversion) and two (a high degree
of inequality aversion) are commonly used to see whether tax reform recommen-
dations are robust to particular ethical judgements (Ahmad and Stem, 1984). In
terms of the calculation of equation (2), the larger is 8 the closer the average budget
share will be to budget shares of the poorest households in the sample. The sec-
ond average budget share is the so-called 'plutocratic budget share' (Prais, 1957)
which is based on ratios of total expenditure (rather than averages of ratios) and
gives the biggest weights to the richest households:^
M M
w. = E X w. / E X . (3)
m=l
The denominator of the A,-ratio represents the efficiency aspect of tax-
and subsidy-induced price changes. A given price change will produce a larger
net revenue effect, the greater is the total consumption of the good and the less the
substitution away from taxed goods:
w'r/w.
h ^ • (4)T.
1-l-t.
e.. 1
1 + X, W.
The total consumption of the good is shown by w., while the substitu-
tion effects are shown by 0^ ,., the derivative of the budget share for good k with
respect to the (log) price of good /. The tax factor gives the share of tax in the final
price. For example, in Indonesia household purchases of oil face a VAT rate of
10 percent, so the tax factor is 0.10/(1 + 0.10) - 0.09 while subsidies meant that
kerosene prices since October 2005 are only 31 percent of the world price, so the
tax factor is -0.69/(1 - 0.69) = 2.23.
The first term of the denominator in equation (4) measures the own-price
distortionary effect ofthe tax or subsidy. If it is large and positive, as would be the
case for a heavily subsidised and price elastic good, the term will contribute to a
small X. and would indicate the low social cost of raising net revenue by decreas-
4. Consider judgements about the effect of taking RplOOO from someone to give some of it to
a person with half the income and destroying the rest (e.g., due to efficiency losses). When 8=0 the
judge would approve of this transfer only if the poorer person received all RplOOO. But when e takes
the values of 1 (or 2) the amount the poorer person receives has to be only Rp500 (or Rp250 if e=2)
in order for the resulting distribution to be judged as giving the same level of social welfare as before
the transfer (Creedy, 1996).
5. The plutocratic budget share is widely used in Consumer Price Index calculations. According to
calculations by Deaton (1998) the "average consumer" according to plutocratic budget shares in the
United States was located at about the 75* percentile of the distribution of household expenditures.
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ing the subsidy on this good. The last term is the sum of the tax factors multiplied
by the cross price elasticities, and captures the effects on other goods (and the
resulting net revenue changes) from the change in the tax on good i.
3. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS
Data from the consumption module of the 1999 SUSENAS survey are
used for 28,964 households located on Java.' Respondents in this survey are asked
to recall their expenditures on 218 food items and 102 non-food products. The
reference period for food is one week, while for non-food expenditures, the sur-
vey collects two measures, each for different reference periods: last month and
the last 12 months (Pradhan, 2001).' For food, fuels and electricity they are also
asked about the quantity purchased so that unit values can be derived. These unit
values are needed because the survey does not collect market prices. The survey's
sampling procedure involves selecting clusters of up to sixteen households within
census enumeration areas. This spatial clustering encourages the assumption that
households within each cluster face the same prices and this feature is exploited
by the estimation method used below.
The five energy products considered - electricity, LPG, kerosene, gaso-
line and oil - contribute almost 4.4 percent of the average household budget, rang-
ing from LPG at 0.14 percent to electricity at 1.82 percent (Table 2).^ The first
three columns of Table 2 describe some of the characteristics of the unit values.
Items like electricity and kerosene have unit values available for almost every
household while information for items like LPG and gasoline is less readily avail-
able. Means of unit values are also shown in the table. These are computed from
those households who make market purchases of the commodity under consid-
eration. The coefficient of variation indicates the degree of heterogeneity within
each group, which is least for commodities like kerosene and gasoline where there
is little quality variation.
The mean unit values show several patterns of interest. On average, con-
sumers paid approximately Rp. 460 per litre for kerosene, while gasoline and oil
cost more than Rp. 1,000 per litre. The mean prices of these energy products vary
6. This household budget survey is only carried out every three years and the 1999 results were the
most recent when the analysis was begun. Java contains approximately 60 percent of the Indonesian
population and, economic activity is even more heavily concentrated there, so the results should still
be relevant to nationwide price reform,
7. One might argue that the difficulty of consumers remembering expenditures for 300 different
products might affect the accuracy of the results. But Pradhan (2001) found that using a survey on the
same sample but at a high level of aggregation (23 categories) yields a lower consumption measure due
to measurement error in the short consumption questionnaire. As a result, even if respondents cannot
recall perfectly in answering the long consumption questionnaire, the effect would be even worse in
other survey designs that use fewer expenditure categories. In addition, one could argue that buying
energy products is not usually done on every day basis, so people should have a better recollection.
8. While gasoline and oil can also be considered as transport fuels they are widely used in the
household sector to power domestic generators, and in fact are more widely consumed than LPG,
especially in the rural sector.
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Tahle 2. Commodities, Sample Sizes and Budget Shares for Java, 1999
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Number of
households
with unit
values
(a)
26,536
2,321
23,677
5,735
3,698
Coefficient
Mean
unit
value
(b)
191.475
1,346.07
456.074
1,014.38
1,056.44
Number
of variation
of unit
value
(c)
0.684
0.189
0.160
0.094
0.617
Number of
of clusters
with unit
values
(d)
1,817
650
1,846
1,430
1,430
Percentage
households
in clusters
in(d)
(e)
26,952
2,334
23,967
5,784
5,238
shares of
total
expenditure
(f)
1.816
0.142
1.470
0.735
0.199
Note: (a) is the number of households with a well-defined unit value, which equals the number of
purchasing households minus those who report in irregular units, (b) in Rupiah.
somewhat by location, with rural households paying a slightly higher price than
urban households for all of the commodities except oil, perhaps because of high
transport costs in rural areas (Appendix Tables la and lb). Furthermore, we also
find evidence that poor households pay substantially higher prices for electricity,
kerosene and gasoline (see Table 3). In addition to the poor being more prevalent
in rural areas, another reason for them paying higher unit values could be due to
bulk discounting, where poorer household tend to buy in small quantities and thus
pay higher prices.'
Given that we are using spatial variation to estimate demand responses,
it is worth looking in more detail at the spatial behaviour of unit values. Table 4
presents the coefficients obtained by regressing the unit values on four province
dummy variables - for West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java (Jakarta
is the omitted category). The results suggest significant inter-province price dif-
ferences. These are especially notable for oil, while (in accord with the results
in Appendix Tables 2a and 2b) the differences are relatively small for gasoline.
Hence, unit values appear to capture at least some spatial price variation.
To get the price responses needed for the marginal social cost calcula-
tions, Deaton's method for estimating elasticities from unit values is used. The
intuition for the method is given by the following quotation:
"Since household surveys typically collect data on
clusters of households that live together in the same village
and are surveyed at the same time, there should be no genuine
variation in market prices within each cluster. Within-cluster
variation in purchases and unit values can therefore be used
to estimate the influence of incomes and household character-
istics on quantities and qualities, and can do so without data
on prices. Variation in unit values within the clusters can also
9. Several recent studies suggest that richer households in developing countries pay lower prices
due to bulk discounts (Attanasio and Frayne, 2006; Gibson, 2006).
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Table 3. Mean Unit Values for Energy Products by Household Income
Distribution for Java, 1999
Quintile
1 (=poorest)
2
3
4
5 (=richest)
Electricity
200.05
193.34
186.14
187.74
190.08
LPG
1,242.42
1,470.14
1,303.43
1,336.67
1,349.37
Kerosene
464.19
459.44
454.16
450.47
451.93
Gasoline
1,032.44
1,030.70
1,015.10
1,017.04
1,007.80
Oil
989.85
949.87
998.54
1,006.13
1,128.94
Note: The household quintiles are formed from the expenditure per capita rank.
Table 4. Price (Unit Values) Variations by Province for Java
West Java
Central Java
Yogyakarta
East Java
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Electricity
0.750
(2.88)
-15.399
(2.91)
-27.320
(3.77)
-18.567
(2.85)
202.688
(2.43)
26,536
0.01
LPG
-30.894
(13.93)
9.266
(15.52)
78.222
(21.52)
-66.705
(15.50)
1,356.919
(8.51)
2,321
0.02
Kerosene
-15.656
(1.82)
-2.605
(1.84)
-18.688
(2.38)
8.070
(1.81)
460.115
(1.59)
23,677
0.02
Gasoline
4.419
(4.75)
1.772
(4.29)
2.365
(4.94)
-1.504
(4.14)
1,013.416
(3.50)
5,735
0.00
Oil
-164.652
(39.67)
-147.245
(35.28)
36.774
(39.65)
-301.126
(33.28)
1,211.622
(27.94)
3,698
0.04
Note: Standard error in ( ) .
tell us a good deal about the importance of measurement error.
By contrast, variation in behaviour between clusters is at least
partly due to cluster-to-cluster variation in prices, and this effect
can be isolated by allowing for the quality effects and measure-
ment errors that are estimated at the first, within-cluster stage."
(Deaton, 1988, p.419).
The procedure starts with a two-equation system of budget shares
and unit values (v^ .^ ) that are both functions of the unobserved prices, (p^_.):
M ' . = I fa (5)
= « (6)
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the G indicates goods, i indicates households and the c indexes clusters. Amongst
the explanatory variables, x. is total expenditure of household i, p^ are the unob-
served prices, z. is a vector of other household characteristics,/^^ is a cluster fixed-
effect in the budget share for good G and M'J,.^  and M'^ .^ , are idiosyncratic errors.
In the first stage, the procedure removes the household-specific effects
of income and other demographic characteristics from the budget shares and unit
values. To do so, equations (5) and (6) are estimated using OLS, where in addition
to X. and z., the specification also controls for all cluster fixed effects, including
those due to unohserved prices, so that the P^, 7^, |3J,, and yj, parameters can be
estimated consistently, even in the absence of market price data. These four pa-
rameters are used to create adjusted budget shares and unit values that have the
quality effects due to income and other factors removed. For example, if richer
households huy higher grade oil (which will have a higher unit value) the first
stage regression can account for this and the adjusted unit value is more like a
price, which does not vary across households in the same community.
The first stage regressions also produce the residuals needed in the sec-
ond stage for estimating the covariances to correct for the effect of any measure-
ment error in unit values and budget shares. The error terms, e"^ .^ . and e'^ .^ , from
equations (5) and (6) contain all the variability in w^^ and v^ ^ not explained by x,
z, or the cluster fixed effects. Assuming a single price per cluster, the unexplained
variation around the cluster mean can indicate measurement error. Hence, a be-
tween-clusters errors-in-variables regression is applied to the (adjusted) average
budget shares and unit values, which have heen purged of household characteris-
tics at the first stage. If it were not for the effect of prices on cluster-wide quality
variation, the parameters estimated at the second stage would he sufficient for
calculating the price responses. Instead, a separability theory of quality (Deaton
1988) has to be used to identify the price effects at the third and final stage.'" Fur-
ther details of the estimation method can be found in Deaton (1997).
One feature of the procedure is that the budget share equation (5) pays no
special attention to non-purchasing households, who have budget shares of zero.
Since subsidy hudgets do not depend on whether demand changes take place at
the extensive or intensive margins, when studying tax and subsidy reform one
needs to include all households, whether they purchase or not (Deaton, 1990).
Therefore, equation (5) is simply viewed as a linear approximation to the regres-
sion function of the budget share conditional on the right-hand-side variables,
averaging over both zeros and non-zeros in much the same way that an aggregate
demand function does (Deaton, 1997)." Including non-purchasing households in
10. Intuitively, there is an identification problem that comes from working with three magnitudes:
quaiity, quantity and price, with data on oniy two of them. Hence, quality downgrading accompanying
a rise in price is treated as an income effect, such that an increase in say oii prices would causes
suhstitution toward lower grades in the same way that wouid follow from a decrease in income.
Consequently, if we know how the quality of oil changes with changes in income, we can predict the
effects of changes in prices on the unit value.
11. Other studies applying Deaton's method to household survey data also follow the same
specification and include households with budget shares of zero. See, for example, Nicita (2004),
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the analysis is needed because the effect of tax and subsidy changes on public
revenue depends on total demand which is affected by both changes in the inten-
sity of purchase by those who continue to purchase and by switching between
purchasing and non-purchasing.
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Table 5 contains results from the first stage (within-cluster) estimation
of the budget share and unit value equations. The coefficients reported are for
the effects of log total expenditures on budget shares, P" and on log unit values,
P' plus summary statistics for each equation. The tables also include the elas-
ticity of quantity demanded with respect to total expenditures, which depends
on coefficients from both the budget share and unit value equations.'^ The other
(unreported) variables used at the first stage include (log) household size, a set of
demographic variables (the number of household members in each of thirteen age
and sex categories as a ratio of household size), and nine educational dummies."
These variables are based on those used by Deaton (1990) in his study of food
demand from the same survey in an earlier year. As can be seen from Table 5, the
first stage estimation of the budget share equations explains from 27 percent of the
variation for oil to 47 percent for kerosene. More of the variation in unit values is
explained, ranging from 31 percent for gasoline to 66 percent for oil.
LPG, gasoline and oil attract positive p° coefficients - indicating luxury
goods whose budget shares rise more than proportionally as household expendi-
ture rises. The total expenditure elasticity for kerosene is 0.44; similar to previous
estimates indicating that kerosene is a necessity. Appendix Tables 2a and 2b show
that rural households tend to have higher expenditure elasticities; for example,
3.08 and 4.08 for gasoline and LPG compared with 2.38 and 2.36 for urban house-
holds. These results imply that rural households are likely to have larger propor-
tionate increases in demand for these products as their income rises.
The quality elasticities, p' are estimated from the effect of changes in
the logarithm of total expenditure on the log of the unit value. With the exception
of kerosene and oil, all of the quality elasticities are negative although none are
very large. Thus, richer households seem to pay less per unit, possibly because
of bulk purchases or more favourable electricity tariffs than are available to the
poor. However, the magnitude of these effects is small, and it is only for the unit
value of oil, where the quality elasticity is 0.07, that there would appear to be
any significant within-cluster variation in unit values. The small response of unit
values to total expenditure occurs in both urban and rural Java (Appendix Tables
2a and 2b). The small size of these quality effects is consistent with other studies
using the Deaton method and so it is the ability of this method to also mitigate the
12. See equation 5.36 of Deaton (1997) for a derivation.
13. The gender and age composition of the household is likely to be reflected in the consumption
basket of the household, so is the educational level of the head of the household. The unreported results
for these variables support their inclusion.
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Table 5. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on Quantity
and Quality for Java
Budget Share EquationUnit Value Equation
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
P»
-0.0003
0.0025
-0.0083
0.0123
0.0037
-1.320
25.660
-36.790
37.600
28.020
0.313
0.310
0.467
0.326
0.273
P'
-0.0302
-0.0150
0.0004
-0.0121
0.0745
tm
-4.460
-0.950
0.110
-1.600
3.580
0.593
0.500
0.344
0.312
0.661
£
1.104
2.740
0.435
2.691
2.800
Note: (3° is the derivative of the budget share with respect to log total expenditures, p' is the derivative
of the (log) unit value with respect to log total expenditures (a.k.a. the 'quality elasticity'), R^ is for
the budget share and unit value regressions, and e is the expenditure elasticity of quantity.
effect of measurement error in unit values that becomes its crucial feature (Dea-
ton, 1997). Nevertheless, the quality adjustment should not be completely ignored
since there is systematic variation with household income for the unit values of
three of the goods.
Table 6 contains the estimated own- and cross-price elasticities for Java.
The symmetry restrictions from demand theory have been imposed on these esti-
mates in order to improve precision of the estimates. Moreover, the symmetry re-
striction will guarantee that the estimates satisfy unique substitution and comple-
mentarity pattems, and rule out the possibility that good / is a substitute for good
i when goody is a complement for good /. In addition to the five energy sources,
there is an extra row and column for "all other goods", the estimates for which
are obtained from the homogeneity and adding-up restrictions. The elasticities are
conditional not only on household size and the dummy variables for household
characteristics mentioned above, but also on a set of province and urban dummy
variables.'''
In addition to the price elasticities, the table also includes bootstrapped
estimates of "standard errors". To calculate these standard errors, 1000 random
draws are taken from the second stage data (i.e., the cluster average budget shares
and unit values, after the effect of household total expenditures and other char-
acteristics have been controlled for). For each of these random draws, all of the
elasticities are recalculated, in effect creating 1000 versions of Table 6. The length
of the interval around the mean of each bootstrapped elasticity that contains 68.3
percent of the bootstrap replications is calculated and one-half of this interval is
used as the estimate of the standard error. The rationale is that if the distribution
of the elasticity estimates was nonnal, 0.683 is the fraction of a normal random
variable within two standard deviations of the mean (Deaton, 1997).
The own-price effects are well determined as are several cross-price ef-
fects. All of the estimated own-price elasticities are negative, as they should be.
The estimated own-price elasticity of demand for kerosene in Java is found to
14. It is not possible to add these regional effects at the first (within-cluster) stage because the
cluster fixed effects would obliterate them.
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Table 6. Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross Price
Elasticities for Java, 1999
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other Cons
Eiectricity
-1.043
(0.02)
-0.108
(0.21)
-0.073
(0.03)
-0.198
(0.13)
-0.262
(0.15)
-0.001
(0.00)
LPG
-0.006
(0.02)
-0.321
(0.89)
-0.015
(0.08)
-1.164
(0.85)
-0.186
(0.21)
-0.002
(0.00)
Kerosene
-0.081
(0.03)
-0.226
(0.97)
-0.960
(0.11)
-1.030
(0.65)
-0.570
(0.32)
-0.004
(0.00)
Gasoline
-0.068
(0.05)
-6.017
(4.42)
-0.406
(0.26)
-0.080
(1.28)
0.791
(0.54)
-0.002
(0.00)
Oil
-0.025
(0.02)
-0.260
(0.30)
-0.059
(0.04)
0.214
(0.15)
-0.382
(0.14)
0.000
(0.00)
Other Cons
0.239
(0.06)
4.207
(3.51)
1.160
(0.22)
-0.421
(0.87)
-2.265
(0.67)
-0.263
(0.37)
Note: Standard error in ( ) ; Results for "All Other Goods" derived from homogeneity and adding
up restriction.
be -0.96 (with a standard error of 0.11). Disaggregating this result, the demand
for kerosene appears considerably more price elastic in rural areas than in urban
areas, possibly reflecting the lower incomes of the rural population. Specifically, a
10 percent increase in the price of kerosene will bring about a 13.3 percent decline
in the quantity of kerosene bought by the rural households, but only 6.4 percent
decline in the urban sector (Appendix Tables 3a and 3b). These are close to the
estimates obtained by Pitt (1985) who used household survey data without cor-
recting for the possible biases caused by unit values. The similarity of elasticity
estimates, and the contrasts with the much more inelastic time series estimates,
suggests that Pitt's conclusion that it would be both equitable and efficient to re-
duce the subsidy on kerosene may in fact have been correct.
The own-price elasticities are also large (in absolute terms) for electric-
ity and LPG, suggesting that subsidies will have caused a considerable amount of
substitution into these products. Amongst the cross-price elasticities, the demand
for electricity, LPG, gasoline and oil with respect to the price of kerosene is nega-
tive, and in some cases, large in absolute value. This apparent complementarity
may reflect the limited but specialized use of these energy sources by Indonesian
households, who use electricity mainly for lighting, while they use LPG mainly
for cooking.
Even with the spatial price variation provided in the data and the imposi-
tion of symmetry restrictions, a majority of the cross-price effects are imprecisely
estimated. Possibly more precision would come from using a sample from all
regions of Indonesia, because of the greater impact of transport costs in causing
relative price differences, but expanding the sample would also bring the risk of
greater uncontrolled heterogeneity.
Household Energy Demand / 33
5. MARGINAL SOCIAL COST CALCULATIONS
Table 7 shows the efficiency effects of cutting subsidies (or raising taxes)
on each of the goods, distinguishing between the terms in the denominator of the
marginal social cost formula (equation (4)). The first column shows the tax factors
(calculated from comparison of the world and domestic prices), while the second
column shows the own price elasticities of quality and quantity together. The prod-
uct of the first and second columns, which is shown as the third column, gives the
own-good contributions to the tax distortion that would be caused by a marginal
increase in price. As can be seen from the table, the own effects for these energy
products are reasonably small, with the exception of kerosene and electricity, for
whom raising prices would save the largest amount from the subsidy budget (ig-
noring any cross-price effects). With regard to these cross-price eifects, they are
largest for gasoline and LPG. According to the combined results in the last column
of Table 7, and noting that nothing yet has been said about distributional issues,
kerosene and then LPG are the most attractive candidates for price rises.
In Table 8, the results of bringing in the equity effects are reported for a
range of the distributional parameter, 8. The first two columns are for e = 0, where
there are no distributional concerns; the cost-benefit ratios are simply the recip-
rocals of the last column in Table 7 and give the same ranking in terms of relative
marginal social costs as was given by the revenue derivatives. The marginal cost
of raising kerosene prices is lowest, and for raising oil prices (which are already
Table 7. Efficiency Aspects of Price Reform in Java with
Symmetry Restriction
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other consumption
T.
1 + T.
-1.60
-0.43
-3.18
-0.95
0.09
0.09
-1.05
-0.63
-1.61
0.00
-0.59
-0.97
Own effect
1.69
0.27
5.11
0.00
-0.05
-0.09
Cross effects
0.38
3.26
0.81
2.70
1.08
-0.10
Total
3.06
4.53
6.92
3.70
2.02
0.81
Table 8. Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price Reform in Java
with Symmetry Restrictions
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other consumption
w' tiv
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
e = 0
X
0.33
0.22
0.14
0.27
0.49
1.23
e=
w'^ /w
0.95
0.78
1.11
0.82
0.79
1.00
0.5
X
0.31
0.17
0.16
0.22
0.39
1.23
e=
w' tw
0.91
0.58
1.17
0.67
0.64
1.01
1
X
0.30
0.13
0.17
0.18
0.32
1.24
E =
w'^ /iv
0.85
0.29
1.19
0.47
0.44
1.01
2
X
0.28
0.06
0.17
0.13
0.22
1.24
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taxed) is highest amongst the energy sources. However, all of the X. for the energy
sources are much lower than for "other consumption" indicating the general desir-
ability of removing all energy subsidies.
Moving across to the right in Table 8, the e parameter increases, giving
larger values to the goods most heavily consumed by the poor and relatively smaller
values to those consumed by households that are better off. For e = 0.5, kerosene
receives the highest social weight, with w* / vv greater than unity. Consequently, as e
increases further, kerosene loses its place as the most attractive candidate for a price
rise, becoming the third most attractive when e = 1 and the fourth most attractive
when £-2. Indeed, with an inequality aversion parameter of e = 2 the lowest social
cost of reduced govemment expenditure (or equivalently additional revenue) would
come from raising LPG prices, followed by raising gasoline prices.
When the results are disaggregated into the rural and urban sector the rec-
ommendations are largely the same. In the rural sector kerosene is the best candidate
for price increases when inequality aversion levels are low, with LPG becoming the
best candidate at higher inequality aversion levels (Appendix Table 5b). In the urban
sector LPG is consistently ranked as the commodity with the lowest social cost
of price increases and the attractiveness of raising kerosene prices diminishes as
inequality aversion rises.
The results suggest that at low levels of inequality aversion kerosene
is the best candidate for reduced subsidies but there may be some reluctance to
cut kerosene subsidies if policy makers are inequality averse. Given this possible
concern, additional evidence on household kerosene use may be useful. Table 9
reports for each sector (rural and urban) and each quintile of the household ex-
penditure distribution, the average quantity of kerosene consumed, the kerosene
budget share and the proportion of households who use kerosene stoves."
While kerosene has a larger share of the budgets of poor households, the
difference is only marked in comparison to the richest quintile of households. In-
deed, in the rural sector, the budget share is almost constant (at 1.4 percent) across
the first four quintiles. The results in the table also show that it is not true that
kerosene is predominantly the fuel of the poor. In rural areas there is a monotonic
increase in the proportion of households using kerosene stoves and in the con-
Table 9. Kerosene Consumption, Budget Shares and Kerosene Stove Use
Quintile
1 (= poorest)
2
3
4
5 (=richest)
Budget share (%)
Rural
1.40
1.38
1.34
1.36
0.99
Urban
2.44
2.18
2.03
1.73
0.92
Quantity (litre/month)
Rural
2.82
3.13
3.41
4.16
4.29
Urban
6.16
5.79
6.01
5.97
4.53
Kerosene Stove Use
Rural
0.19
0.29
0.37
0.45
0.53
Urban
0.58
0.62
0.78
0.75
0.53
15. This information is derived from the third wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)
since similar information is not available in the SUSENAS.
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sumption level of kerosene when moving from poorer to richer quintiles. In urban
areas the three middle quintiles all have higher rates of kerosene stove usage than
the poorest quintile and the consumption level of kerosene is roughly constant
across quintiles. Thus, a majority of the kerosene subsidies will not be captured
by the poor, especially in rural areas, and the replacement of energy subsidies with
targeted income subsidies is likely to be both more efficient and more equitable.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have used household budget survey data from Indonesia
to estimate the marginal social cost of indirect taxes and subsidies on five house-
hold energy sources. Regardless of assumptions about inequality aversion, all of
these energy sources are attractive candidates for price increases, when compared
with the social cost of revenue raised from taxes on other goods and services. The
calculations also show that reducing expenditure on subsidies by allowing further
increases in the consumer price of kerosene would be desirable, taking into ac-
count both efficiency and equity. Thus the suggested directions of reform are in
line with the actual price reforms carried out and they indicate the desirability of
furthering these reforms.
The motivation for these reforms in Indonesia has been the heavy cost
of maintaining consumer energy subsidies as world energy prices soar. There
are likely to be other developing countries facing a similar set of issues. From a
methodological point of view, the availability of household survey data in other
developing countries suggests that similar analyses could be carried out in settings
where price elasticity estimates are needed to evaluate the effects of price distor-
tions in consumer energy markets.
Appendix Table la. Commodities, Sample Sizes and Budget Shares for
Urban Java, 1999
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Number of
households
with unit
values
(a)
12,305
2,088
10,371
3,531
2,206
Coefficient
Mean
unit
value
(b)
182.738
1,344.86
444.335
1,005.72
1,070.15
Number
of variation
of unit
value
(c)
0.667
0.185
0.155
0.082
0.620
Number of
of clusters
with unit
values
(d)
829
527
823
729
582
Percentage
households
in clusters
in(d)
(e)
12,018
1,706
10,338
3,103 .
2,739
shares of
total
expenditure
(f)
2.05
0.28
• 1.62
1.01
0.25
Note: See Table 2.
36 / The Energy Journal
Appendix Table lb. Commodities, Sample Sizes and Budget Shares for
Rural Java, 1999
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Number of
households
with unit
values
(a)
14,231
233
13,306
2,204
1,492
Coefficient
Mean
unit
value
(b)
199.029
1,356.88
465.224
1,028.26
1,036.18
Number
of variation
of unit
value
(c)
0.693
0.225
0.161
0.109
0.613
Number of
of clusters
with unit
values
(d)
988
123
1,023
701
567
Percentage
households
in clusters
in(d)
(e)
14,574
627
13,616
2,676
2,493
shares of
total
expenditure
(f)
1.63
0.03
1.35
0.52
0.16
Note: See Table 2.
Appendix Table 2a. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on
Quantity and Quality for Urban Java
Budget Share EquationUnit Value Equation
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
P»
0.001
0.004
-0.013
0.014
0.004
'(P°)
2.120
20.980
-42.970
26.460
18.480
R'
0.275
0.301
0.494
0.340
0.320
P'
-0.005
-0.012
0.004
-0.012
0.074
'(P')
-0.620
-0.740
0.770
-1.450
2.880
R'
0.612
0.478
0.323
0.304
0.655
e
1.042
2.358
0.218
2.382
2.427
Note: See Table 3.
Appendix Table 2b. First Stage Estimates: Effect of Total Expenditures on
Quantity and Quality for Rural Java
Budget Share EquationUnit Value Equation
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
p»
-0.002
0.001
-0.004
0.011
0.004
'(P°)
-6.140
12.660
-11.510
26.150
20.890
R'
0.342
0.226
0.471
0.286
0.209
P'
-0.058
-0.357
-0.003
-0.003
0.053
-5.570
-0.350
-0.490
-0.200
1.470
R'
0.577
0.666
0.346
0.341
0.677
e
0.952
4.076
0.718
3.080
3.271
Note: See Table 3.
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Appendix Table 3a. Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross
Price Elasticities for Urban Java, 1999
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other Cons
Electricity
-0.990
(0.03)
-0.128
(0.14)
0.003
(0.04)
-0.175
(0.11)
0.039
(0.21)
-0.001
(0.00)
LPG
-0.014
(0.02)
-0.365
(0.62)
0.027
(0.11)
-0.894
(0.47)
-0.119
(0.21)
-0.002
(0.00)
Kerosene
-0.011
(0.03)
0.126
(0.67)
-0.635
(0.18)
-0.027
(0.26)
-0.260
(0.28)
0.001
(0.00)
Gasoline
-0.073
(0.06)
-3.213
(1.69)
0.005
(0.16)
-0.868
(0.23)
0.942
(0.55)
-0.002
(0.00)
Oil
0.008
(0.03)
-0.106
(0.19)
-0.034
(0.04)
0.234
(0.14)
-0.372
(0.16)
0.001
(0.00)
Other Cons
0.043
(0.08)
1.340
(1.87)
0.416
(0.29)
-0.640
(0.62)
-2.731
(0.71)
-0.274
(0.35)
Note: See Table 4
Appendix Table 3b. Symmetry Constrained Estimates of Own and Cross
Price Elasticities for Rural Java, 1999
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other Cons
Electricity
-1.108
(0.03)
-1.493
(2.13)
-0.157
(0.07)
-0.036
(0.02)
-0.707*
(0.21)
-0.002
(0.00)
LPG
-0.029
(0.04)
-1.616
(2.85)
-0.119
(0.21)
0.000
(0.01)
0.024
(0.39)
-0.001
(0.00)
Kerosene
-0.132
(0.06)
-5.008
(8.91)
-1.331
(0.25)
-0.032
(0.00)
-1.460
(0.77)
-0.003
(0.00)
Gasoline
0.000
(0.00)
0.000
(0.18)
0.000
(0.00)
-1.000
(1.09)
0.000
(0.00)
0.000
(0.00)
Oil
-0.065
(0.02)
0.118
(1.92)
-0.168
(0.09)
0.000
(0.00)
-0.489
(0.20)
-0.001
(0.00)
Other Cons
0.439
(0.08)
3.960
(10.51)
1.059
(0.36)
-2.010
(1.02)
-0.692
(0.92)
-0.264
(0.26)
Note: See Table 4
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Appendix Table 4a. Efficiency Aspects of Price Reform in Urban Java witb
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other consumption
T,
-1.60
-0.43
-2.23
-0.47
0.09
0.09
w.
-0.99
-0.35
-0.53
-0.89
-0.53
-1.00
Own effect
1.58
0.15
1.18
0.42
-0.05
-0.09
Cross effects
0.04
1.10
0.06
0.48
0.08
-0.02
Totai
2.62
2.25
2.24
1.90
1.04
0.89
Appendix Table 4b. Efficiency Aspects of Price Reform in Rural Java witb
Symmetry Restriction
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other consumption
T.
1 + T,
-1.60
-0.43
-2.23
-0.47
0.09
0.09
-1.09
-1.07
-1.36
-1.00
-0.75
-0.99
Own effect
1.74
0.46
3.04
0.47
-0.07
-0.09
Cross effects
0.22
1.51
0.25
0.00
1.97
-0.04
Totai
2.97
2.97
4.28
1.47
2.90
0.87
Appendix Table 5a. Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price
Reform in Urban Java witb Symmetry Restrictions
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Oil
Other consumption
e =
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0
X
0.38
0.44
0.45
0.53
0.97
1.12
E =
w^lw
0.95
0.78
1.11
0.82
0.79
1.00
0.5
X
0.36
0.35
0.50
0.43
0.76
1.12
e =
w'^ Iw
0.91
0.58
1.17
0.67
0.64
1.01
1
X
0.35
0.26
0.52
0.35
0.62
1.13
£=2
w^ Iw
0.85
0.29
1.19
0.47
0.44
1.01
X
0.32
0.13
0.53
0.25
0.42
1.13
Appendix Table 5b. Equity Effects and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Price
Reform in Rural Java witb Symmetry Restrictions
Commodities
Electricity
LPG
Kerosene
Gasoline
Lubricant Oil
Other consumption
w' Iw
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
e = 0
X
0.34
0.34
0.23
0.68
0.35
1.15
E =
w' Iw
0.95
0.78
1.11
0.82
0.79
1.00
0.5
X
0.32
0.26
0.26
0.55
0.27
1.15
e=
w' Iw
0.91
0.58
1.17
0.67
0.64
1.01
1
X
0.31
0.19
0.27
0.46
0.22
1.16
e=
w^lw
0.85
0.29
1.19
0.47
0.44
1.01
2
X
0.29
0.10
0.28
0.32
0.15
1.16
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